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19761 RECENT CASES
perpetuates the risk of injury from a defective motor vehicle .3 As to
indemnity, the burden imposed upon parties in the distributive chain
to seek the creator of the defect should likewise be imposed upon the
used car dealer."2 The relative difficulty in obtaining indemnification is
a consideration; however, in view of the used car dealer's position in the
commercial market, it should not outweigh the need for effective reme-
dies to an injured plaintiff.
Mark Spadoro
Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-INJURIEs ARISING
OUT OF PERSONAL DISPUTES MAY BE WORK-RELATED AND THEREFORE
COMPENSABLE-Converters, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 61 I1l.2d 218,
334 N.E.2d 155 (1975).
In order for an employee to qualify for workmen's compensation bene-
fits, his injuries must arise out of and in the course of employment.' By
299, 304-06 (1971) (jury verdict for defendant used car dealer that defect in seven-year-
old used car was not "unreasonably dangerous" upheld as proper under doctrine of strict
liability in tort).
31. A 1973 survey of the used car market indicates that there are more than 100 million
used cars in the United States. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1973, at 57, col. 7. The auto industry
estimates sales of 25 million used cars in 1974, including private trading. N.Y. Times, Dec.
28, 1974, at 31, col. 4. In 1973, sales of new automobiles by domestic and foreign manufac-
turers were approximately 11,433,325. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 43, col. 3. This figure
dropped to 8,856,884 in 1974. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 43, col. 3. In addition, dealers
at United States-Canadian wholesale auctions purchased 1.5 million used cars. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 28, 1974, at 35, col. 6-7. Apparently, used motor vehicles acquired by dealers
account for a conservative 13% of annual sales by domestic and foreign manufacturers.
(This percentage is based on 1973 statistics and does not include trade-ins to dealers.)
32. Such a burden would not be unreasonable. Liability resulting from defects discover-
able upon reasonable inspection or otherwise within the dealer's control, should rest with
the dealer as part of an obligation to provide a reasonably safe car. See 61 Ill.2d 17,22,
329 N.E.2d 785,787 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
Liability for defects beyond the scope of the dealer's control, such as structural or
metallurgical defects traceable to the manufacturer, should ultimately rest with that
party. But, in the interest of protecting the injured plaintiff, the used car dealer should
be liable initially for the loss. This would not prejudice the dealer because through the
process of strict liability indemnity the used car dealer could shift the burden of ultimate
loss to the distributive party responsible for such defect if he chose to do so.
1. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1 et seq. (1975).
The heart of every compensation act, and the source of most litigation in the
compensation field, is the coverage formula. Forty-two states, and the Long-
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definition, the term "arising out of" requires that the accident have its
origin in a risk incidental to the employment, whereas, "in the course
of' describes an injury which occurs within the time, place and circum-
stances of the employment.' Although this appears to be a dual require-
ment, the ultimate test is whether the injury is work-related. When an
employee's injury results from an assault, a causal connection must be
shown between the working conditions and the assault for the injury to
be compensable.4 Conversely, if the assault arises from a personal mat-
ter, having no connection with employment, no right to compensation
exists.' This formula of "arising out of and in the course of employment"
was strained by the Illinois Supreme Court in Converters, Inc. v. In-
dustrial Commission.' This casenote will examine the Converters deci-
sion and its effect on the traditional compensation formula.
In Converters, the claimant was physically assaulted by a co-
employee7 in the plant locker room after work following an alleged dice
game.' Traditionally, an injury sustained after the end of the work
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act have adopted the entire
British Compensation Act formula: injury "arising out of and in the course of
employment."
1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.10 [hereafter cited as LARSON].
2. See Armour v. Indus. Comm'n, 397 III. 433, 74 N.E.2d 704 (1947) (worker who inter-
posed comments in dispute between boss and fellow worker and was then struck by the
co-worker, did not receive injuries in the course of his employment); Pekin Cooperage Co.
v. Indus. Comm'n, 285 Ill. 31, 120 N.E. 530 (1918) (employee who when leaving work fell
off a ramp leading from "employees' exit" received injuries arising out of and in the course
of employment); McField v. Lincoln Hotel, 35 Ill.App.2d 340, 182 N.E.2d 905 (1st Dist.
1962) (injury to employee in fight with co-worker over the proper conduct of each other's
job, arose out of the employment).
3. In practice, these two requirements are not always applied independently. Most
cases reveal a "quantum theory," where deficiencies in one may be made up by strength
in the other. For example, if the "in the course of" quantity is very small, but the "arising
out of" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum; the converse
being likewise true, LARSON supra note 1, at § 29.
4. See Fischer v. Indus. Comm'n, 408 II1. 115, 96 N.E.2d 478 (1951); Math Igler's Casino
v. Indus. Comm'n, 394 Il. 330, 68 N.E.2d 773 (1946); Scholl v. Indus. Comm'n, 366 Ill.
588, 10 N.E.2d 360 (1937).
5. See Fischer v. Indus. Comm'n, 408 Ill. 115, 96 N.E.2d 478 (1951); Triangle Auto
Painting & Trimming Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 346 Ill. 609, 178 N.E. 886 (1931); Franklin
Coal & Coke Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 322 Ill. 23, 152 N.E. 498 (1926).
6. 61 Ill.2d 218, 334 N.E.2d 155 (1975).
7. Sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a finding that the co-worker was intoxi-
cated. 61 1ll.2d at 223, 334 N.E.2d at 158.
8. The investigating officer and several employees of Converters testified that the vic-
tim, George Pearson, and the assailant, Morris Andrews, had had an argument over the
alleged theft of ten dollars by Pearson during a dice game. The testimony indicated that
the game began shortly after Pearson's shift ended and continued for two or three hours.
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day9 and arising out of a personal dispute0 is non-compensable. How-
ever, by ignoring the evidence concerning the dice game, and by placing
the cause of the assault in a work-related context, the court was able to
grant compensation. In reaching its decision, the court relied solely upon
the testimony of a third-party co-worker that the assault arose out of a
dispute occurring earlier in the day." The court grounded its decision
on a basic tenet of workmen's compensation law which provides that the
resolution of a disputed factual question may be set aside only when it
is against the manifest weight of the evidence." In this case, the testi-
mony of one employee was sufficient to sustain the Industrial Commis-
sion's findings.
The court uses the manifest weight rationale to sidestep the problem
of applying the more stringent traditional formula with regard to inju-
ries from assaults. As courts have looked for ways to award compensa-
tion, the formula "arising out of and in the course of" has been greatly
strained. It has been predicted that soon injuries compensable under
workmen's compensation will bear little, if any, relation to the particu-
lar occupation of the claimant.'" When such a change in the traditional
This directly contradicted Pearson's testimony before the arbitrator in which Pearson
alleged the incident took place immediately after the end of his shift. 61 ll.2d at 219, 334
N.E.2d at 156.
9. See note 2, supra.
10. See note 5, supra.
11. The employee saw Andrews and Pearson arguing earlier in the day after Pearson
asked Andrews to move so that Pearson could mop the floors. However, this same em-
ployee also testified that he had overheard an argument concerning the alleged theft
during the dice game. 61 1ll.2d at 222, 334 N.E.2d at 158. This contradictory evidence
raises the question whether the claimant met his burden of proof. Wilhelm v. Indus.
Comm'n, 399 Ill. 80, 77 N.E.2d 174 (1948). He must prove by sufficient evidence that the
accidental injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. Corn Prod. Ref. Co.
v. Indus. Comm'n, 6 Ill.2d 439, 128 N.E.2d 919 (1955). A preponderance of the evidence
is the standard of proof required. Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 378 Ill. 195,
37 N.E.2d 806 (1941).
12. In determining questions of manifest weight of the evidence, it is clear that the
number of witnesses may be a factor, but it is not the controlling consideration. In addi-
tion the weight to be accorded this factor may depend upon the nature of the issue of fact
involved. Pugh v. Bershad, 133 Ill.App.2d 174, 177, 272 N.E.2d 745, 748 (1st Dist. 1971)
(jury verdict that plaintiff, injured while crossing street, was not contributorily negligent
will not be set aside as against the manifest weight of the evidence though defendant had
three witnesses to plaintiff's one); Haas v. Woodard, 61 Ill.App.2d 378, 384-85, 209 N.E.2d
864, 867 (1st Dist. 1965) (despite the fact that plaintiff had two witnesses to defendant's
one, a jury finding in favor of defendant was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence).
13. Henderson, Should Workmen's Compensation Be Extended to Nonoccupational
Injuries? 48 TEXAS L. REV. 117, 121 (1969).
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formula occurs without legislative intervention the result is inconsis-
tency in awarding compensation.
If in fact the court is extending compensability to cover injuries from
assaults that are not work-related, other jurisdictions have preceded
Illinois in doing so. For example, the Appellate Court for the District of
Columbia 4 as early as 1940 held that even if the subject of the dispute
is unrelated to the work, the injury from the assault is compensable if
the work of the participants brought them together and created the
relation and conditions which resulted in the clash. 5 The New York
Court of Appeals"6 rendered an even more expansive test:
An award of compensation may be sustained even though the result of
an assault [citation omitted], so long as there is any nexus, however
slender, between the motivation for the assault and the employment. 7
It is difficult to conceive of an injury to an employee from an assault by
a co-employee which would not be compensable under this theory; the
previous requirement that the dispute be "related" to the employment
appears to be meaningless. 8 Unfortunately, in Converters, the Illinois
court's expansion of compensability is not as explicit as that of the
courts of the District of Columbia and New York.
Although the court in Converters based its decision on the manifest
weight rationale, a theory of compensation based on the foreseeability
doctrine runs, sub silentio, through the case. The claimant contended
that the injury should be compensable because it was foreseeable." The
status of the doctrine of foreseeability 0 in Illinois is uncertain and it
may be that the only criterion is whether the injury is in fact connected
with the employment.2' However, the use of the doctrine of foreseeabil-
14. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11. (D. C. Cir. 1940).
15. Id. at 17-18.
16. Seymour v. Rivera Appliances Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 406, 271 N.E.2d 224, 322 N.Y.S.2d
243 (1971). The victim employee had intervened on behalf of two employees who were
arguing. The argument resumed away from the employer's premises after work. The next
day the intervener was killed by the other two employees.
17. 28 N.Y.2d at 409, 271 N.E.2d at 225, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
18. Wolff, Workmen's Compensation, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249 (1973).
19. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 19-23, Converters, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 61 Ill.2d
218, 334 N.E.2d 155 (1975).
20. Earlier courts recognized that maliciously assaulted persons were entitled to work-
men's compensation where the employer knew of the risk. Small, The Effect of Workmen's
Compensation Trends in Agency-Tort Concepts of Scope of Employment, 11 NACCA L.J.
19, 23-25 (1953).
21. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 6.50. See also Taylor Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 301
I1. 548, 134 N.E. 172 (1922); Baum v. Indus. Comm'n, 288 Ill. 516, 123 N.E. 625 (1919);
Swift & Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 287 Il1. 564, 122 N.E. 796 (1919).
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ity is not without support.Y Employers who knew or should have known
that an injury to an employee was imminent have uniformly been held
liable for that injury.2 3 Thus it is not unreasonable that the employer in
Converters be held liable in that the injury sustained by the claimant
was foreseeable. The employer knew that dice games2' frequently oc-
cured on the premises and was aware of the assailant's inebriation 5 on
the day of the assault, conditions which could produce unruly behavior.
Rather than couching the decision in the terms of a manifest weight
rationale, the preferred method of judicial expansion of the standard of
compensation is to utilize the foreseeability doctrine. Basing decisions
on foreseeability would promote predictability and facilitate subsequent
case interpretation because of the legal community's general compre-
hension of foreseeability and its reasonable person standard.
Converters strains the traditional criteria for determining compensa-
tion and establishes that injuries arising out of personal disputes may
now be held work-related and therefore compensable. Failing to provide
explicit guidance to the courts, commissions, and attorneys, Converters
frustrates efforts at interpretation and leads to unpredictability of fu-
ture decisions. Notwithstanding any future judicial resolution, a sub-
stantial revision of the existing formula should preferably be made by
the legislature.
Mary Beth Denefe
22. See, e.g., Trunkline Gas Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Ill.2d 542, 240 N.E.2d 655 (1968);
United States Indus. v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 I1.2d 469, 240 N.E.2d 637 (1968); Ace Pest
Control, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 32 Ill.2d 386, 205 N.E.2d 453 (1965); American Freight
Forwarding Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 Ill.2d 293, 201 N.E.2d 399 (1964).
23. In Ace Pest Control, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 32 Ill.2d 386, 205 N.E.2d 453 (1965),
an employee truck driver stopped to give aid to a motorist in distress and received injuries.
The court in awarding compensation, stated that since the employer did not prohibit its
drivers from stopping in such situations, the rendering of aid was discretionary and could
have reasonably been expected. However, in United States Indus. v. Indus. Comm'n, 40
Ill.2d 469, 240 N.E.2d 637 (1968), a travelling employee was injured in a car accident
during a pleasure drive. The court held the claimant's action was clearly unanticipated
and unforeseeable, not normally to be expected of a travelling employee.
24. Claimant made an offer of proof that for several years prior to the date of the
accident, dice games had taken place once or twice a week. 61 Ill.2d at 222, 334 N.E.2d
at 158.
25. A foreman at Converters testified that on the day of the assault he had asked
Andrews to leave because Andrews had been drinking or was on drugs. Other employees
also testified they were aware of the assailant's state of intoxication. 61 l.2d at 220-22,
334 N.E.2d at 157-58.
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